Xoring the output of k permutations, k ≥ 2 is a very simple way to construct pseudo-random functions (PRF) from pseudo-random permutations (PRP). Moreover such construction has many applications in cryptography (see [2, 3, 4, 5] for example). Therefore it is interesting both from a theoretical and from a practical point of view, to get precise security results for this construction. In this paper, we will describe the best attacks that we have found on the Xor of k random n-bit to n-bit permutations. When k = 2, we will get an attack of computational complexity O(2 n ). This result was already stated in [2] . On the contrary, for k ≥ 3, our analysis is new. We will see that the best known attacks require much more than 2 n computations when not all of the 2 n outputs are given, or when the function is changed on a few points. We obtain like this a new and very simple design that can be very usefull when a security larger than 2 n is wanted, for example when n is very small.
Introduction
The problem of converting pseudorandom permutations (PRP) into pseudorandom functions (PRF) named "Luby-Rackoff backwards" was first considered in [3] . This problem is obvious if we are interested in an assymptotical security model (since a PRP is then a PRF), but not if we are interested in achieving more optimal and concrete security bounds. More precisely, the loss of security when regarding a PRP as a PRF comes from the "birthday attack" which can distinguish a random permutation from a random function of n bits to n bits, in 2 n 2 operations and 2 n 2 queries. In [5] (Theorem 2 p.474), it has been proved that the Xor of k PRP gives a PRF with security at least in O(2 k k+1 n ). (For k = 2 this gives O(2 2 3 n )). Moreover in [2] , it has been proved that the Xor of two PRP gives a PRF with security at least in O(2 n /n 2 3 ) and at most in O(2 n ), which is much better than the birthday bound in O(2 n 2 ). An interesting question is "Can we hope to get even better bound than O(2 n ) with more than two Xor, particularly if not all the 2 n inputs/outputs are given to the cryptanalysis ?" In this paper, we will study this question. Let F k denotes the Xor of k random permutations. Let G k denotes the function F k except on a few secret (or public) points x i where G(x i ) is random (for example it can be only the point 0). We will distinguish 3 kinds of attack scenarios:
1. The adversary has access to the full codebook of F k , i.e. exactly all the 2 n pairs of function input and function output.
2. The adversary has access to almost, but not all, the entire codebook of F k , i.e. to m pairs with m 2 n and m < 2 n .
3. The adversary wants to attack G k (instead of F k ) and he has access to the full codebook of G k .
To analyse these scenarios, we will introduce what we call "stable" attacks and "unstable" attacks. An attack will be called "stable" if the attack is still valid with a similar complexity when a few points of the functions are changed to truly random values. We will present the best "stable" and "unstable" attacks that we have found on the Xor of k functions, k ≥ 2 when we study a generator of such functions (not only one such function). We will see that in Scenario 1, the best security bound is indeed in O(2 n ), but in Scenario 2 and 3, the best attacks have an even greater complexity. So it gives candidate schemes to build PRF from PRP in a still very simple way and with potentially even better security. Since building PRF from PRP has many applications (see [2, 3, 4] ), we think that these results are really interesting both from theoretical and from practical point of view. The paper is organised as follows. We will analyse Scenario 1 in section 2, Scenario 2 in section 3 and 4, and Scenario 3 in section 5. Then we will analyse the case where the k Xor are done on only one permutation (instead of k independant permutations) in section 6. Some other variants and open problems are presented in section 7. Finally, the results obtained are summarized in section 8. We have decided to present in Appendices the computation of all the mean values and standard deviations needed.
2 Scenario 1 on
Notations: In all this paper we will denote I n = {0, 1} n . F n will be the set of all applications from I n to I n , and B n the set of all permutations from I n to I n . So |I n | = 2 n , |F n | = 2 n·2 n , and |B n | = (2 n )!. x ∈ R A will mean that x is randomly chosen in A, with a uniform distribution. Aim: In this section we want to distinguish f ⊕ g, with f, g ∈ R B n from h ∈ R F n . Attack. We analyze a function G, we want to know if G = f ⊕ g, f, g ∈ R B n , or if G = h, h ∈ R F n . If we have access to all the 2 n values G(x), then we can compute T = ⊕ 2 n i=1 G(i). If G = f ⊕ g, then with probability 1, we have T = 0. (Proof: If f is a permutation we have
n , then we have T = 0 with probability 1 2 n . Therefore, by computing T , we can distinguish f ⊕ g from h with a very good probability. This attack is in O(2 n ) computations, with O(2 n ) input/output values.
Aim with k ≥ 3: We want to distinguish
Attack. We use exactly the same attack: by computing T , we can distinguish f 1 ⊕ f 2 ⊕ . . . ⊕ f k from h with a very good probability. This attack is in O(2 n ) computations, with O(2 n ) input/output values.
Therefore, it seems that 2 n is the best security result that we can get with k Xor of permutations, for all k. However we can notice that if instead of having
Our attack distinguish between a function and the xor of k permutations such that G = f 1 ⊕ f 2 ⊕ . . . ⊕ f k except on a few points (or even except only on 0), and on these few points the output of G is truly random, then the above attack fails. We will say that this attack is "unstable". More precisely, we will define "stable" attacks as follows: Definition We want to distinguish a function G of F n (generated by a function generator) from truly random functions f ∈ R F n with an attack A. Let P (n) be a polynomial in n and x 1 , . . . x φ be φ points randomly chosen in I n with φ ≤ P (n). Let Φ = {x 1 , . . . x φ }. Let G = G on all the points of F n − Φ and G (x i ) be truly random on all x i ∈ Φ. Then if for each such sets Φ the attack A is polynomial (in n) against G , we will say that this attack is stable on G.
Remark: It is possible to store a few random points with O(n) random bits, i.e. polynomial in n, but to store a random function of F n , we need n · 2 n random bits, i.e. not polynomial in n. To avoid an "unstable" attack on G, we have to change the design of G only on a few points. However to avoid a "stable" attack on G, the design of G must be deeply changed.
3 Scenario 2 on f ⊕ g with O(2 2n ) computations Aim: we want to distinguish a generator A of functions f ⊕ g, with f, g ∈ R B n , from a generator B of functions h, with h ∈ R F n ; i.e. we can have access to more than one test function G, these G functions are generated from A or from B and we have to distinguish these two cases with a non negligible probability. Moreover for each G function, we have access to all the inputs/outputs, except a few points. (Or alternatively, from generator A, G = f ⊕ g except on a few points). Attack. We will count the number N of collisions on the functions G. Therefore if we have access to m inputs/outputs for G, G(
(In our attack we will generally choose m 2 n but we will not need m = 2 n .)
Case of random functions. We know that for a random function of F n , we have E(N ) =
where E(N ) denotes the mean value of N , and σ(N ) denotes the standard deviation of N . (See Appendix A for the proof of these results). Therefore, for a generator with µ such functions,
. . , X n are n independent events with E(X i ) = E and σ(X i ) = σ, we have E(X 1 + . . . + X n ) = nE and σ(X 1 + . . . X n ) = √ nσ. Here the generator generates independent functions h 1 , . . . h n ).
Case of f ⊕g. We know that if G = f ⊕g, with f, g ∈ R B n , we have
, (see Appendix B for the proof of these results). Therefore, for a generator with µ such functions,
(This shows that we have in average slightly more collisions with f ⊕ g than with h), and
From Bienayme-Tchebichev theorem we know that we will be able to distinguish h from f ⊕ g with a good probability when
Here these conditions give:
For m 2 n , this gives: µ ≥ 2 n and the complexity of this attack is in
Conclusion: This is a "stable attack" on f ⊕ g with O(2 2n ) computations.
Remark: This is the best "stable" generic attack on f ⊕ g that we have found.
4 Scenario 2 on
Aim: we want to distinguish a generator A of functions
from a generator B of functions h ∈ R F n . We assume that we have access to m inputs/outputs values for each function G, with m = 2 n (but m 2 n if we want), i.e. we look for a stable attack (the attack will still be valid if a few inputs/outputs of G are changed). Remark: Section 3 was a special case of section 4 with k = 2. Attack. We will count the number N of collisions on all the functions G. Therefore, if we have access to m inputs/outputs for each function G, N is the number of (i, j), i < j, such that:
Case of random functions. We have seen in Section 3 (and in Appendix B) that for a random function of F n , we have:
Therefore, for a generator with µ such functions,
2 n ), (Proof: see Appendix C). Therefore, for a generator with µ such functions,
From Bienayme-Tchebichev theorem we know that we will be able to distinguish h from f 1 ⊕ f 2 ⊕ . . . ⊕ f k with a good probability when
For m 2 n , this gives: µ ≥ 2 (2k−3)n and therefore the complexity of this attack is in O(µ · m) computations, i.e. in O(2 (2k−2)n ).
Analysis of Scenario 3
Let G * be perfectly random on ϕ points, and G * (x) = f 1 (x)⊕f 2 (x)⊕. . .⊕f k (x), with f 1 , . . . , f k ∈ R B n , on the 2 n − ϕ other points. Let φ be the set of the ϕ special points. Let assume that we know G * on m points x i , such that ϕ of these point are in Φ and m − ϕ are not in Φ, ϕ ≤ ϕ. Let N be the number of collisions G * (x i ) = G * (x j ), with i < j. We have: N = N 1 + N 2 + N 3 with N 1 = number of collisions with x i / ∈ φ and x j / ∈ φ, i < j. N 2 = number of collisions with x i / ∈ φ and x j ∈ φ, i < j. N 3 = number of collisions with x i ∈ φ and x j ∈ φ, i < j. We have E(N ) = E(N 1 ) + E(N 2 ) + E(N 3 ). From Theorem 1 of Appendix C, we have:
So if m 2 n and ϕ << 2 n , we have ϕ << 2 n and
Therefore this attack by counting N for G * will work with the same complexity as the attack by counting N on f 1 (x) ⊕ f 2 (x) ⊕ . . . ⊕ f k (x) as long as ϕ << 2 n , so we say that this attack is "stable". (Thias also means that "scenario 3" and "scenario 2" have the same conplexity).
A simple variant of the schemes with only one permutation

Variant with 2 Xor
Instead of
, with f ∈ R B n and x ∈ I n−1 . This variant was already introduced in [2] . There are many common results between G and G but also a few differences. It is possible to prove that our attacks (stable and unstable) on G are also valid on G with similar properties. The (unstable) attack of Section 2 in O(2 n ) is also valid for G , since ⊕ 2 n x=1 G (x) = ⊕ 2 n i=1 i = 0, and the number of collisions for the (stable) attacks of Section 3 will be similar for G and G .
A specific attack on G There is however a specific attack on G that do not exist on G since ∀x ∈ I n , G (x) = 0. Therefore, if we know m outputs y i of G, we can test if ∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, y i = 0 (#). The probability of this event is 1 on G and (1 −
2 n is not close to 0, we can distinguish f ∈ R F n from G with a good probability. We will call A this attack. Like the attack on ⊕ 2 n i=1 G(i), this attack A requires O(2 n ) queries and O(2 n ) computations. (This attack was already described in [2] .) However unlike the attack on ⊕ 2 n i=1 G(i), this attack A does not requires m = 2 n , but only to have m 2 n not close to 0. Stability of the attack Let G φ be the function G ,except on φ randomly and secretly chosen points x i , and on these points G φ is perfectly random. The probability of (#) is 1 on G , is ( 
2 n on f ∈ R F n . Therefore, if φ is ≤ P (n) and if m 2 n , with p(n) a polynomial in n, the probability of (#) is about 1 on G φ , and is about 1 e on f ∈ R F n , so this attack A is still able to distinguish G φ from f ∈ R F n . Therefore A is "stable" with our definition of "stable".
Variant with ≥ 3 Xor With 3 Xor, instead of G(x) = (f 1 ⊕ f 2 ⊕ f 3 )(x), if x = 0, with f 1 , f 2 , f 3 ∈ R B n , and G(0) random, we can study G (x) = f (x 00) ⊕ f (x 01) ⊕ f (x 10), if x = 0, with f ∈ R B n and x ∈ I n−2 , G (0) random. Now G (x) can have the value 0, and as with f ⊕ g ⊕ h, f, g, h ∈ B n with this design the best known attacks have complexity greater than O(2 n ). More generally, with k Xor, instead of using k random permutations of B n , we can use only one. From a theoretical point of view the analysis, attacks and results will be similar if the number of Xor is ≥ 3, but from a practical point of view these variants may be sometime a bit better since they use only one random permutation of B n .
Other variants and open problems
Let assume, for example, that we want to build a pseudo-random function of F n from two random permutations of B n . We have
Here we use Stirling formula and |F n | = (2 n ) 2 n = 2 n·2 n . So |B n | 2 ≥ |F n | and therefore, from an information theoretic point of view, we may imagine to transform a random element of B 2 n in a pseudo-random element of F n with a security bound much better than O(2 n ). In fact, if we have a very small probability that the transformation fails, i.e. gives no element of F n , then we may even hope to get a perfectly random element of F n when the construction works.
Remark.
A similar problem arise when we want to transform for example a perfectly random integer x of [1, 11] into a perfectly random integer y of [1, 2] . We can decide that if x ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} then y = 1, and if x ∈ {6, 7, 8, 9, 10} then y = 2, and if x = 11, then no output y is given. Then when an output y is given, y is perfectly random in [1, 2] .
It may be interesting to design a similar transformation from B 2 n to F n , i.e. with a high probability the construction will give an output, and when it gives an output, this output will be a perfectly random element of F n . However, we want to perform only O(n) operations (or polynomial in n) to get the output (as (f 1 ⊕ g 2 )(x) where only 2 operations are needed), not O(2 n ). Therefore, this problem may have no solution. However, it may exist some designs with better security results than our constructions with the same number of operations. In any case, it is an interesting and open question to evaluate the best possible designs when only O(n) (or a polynomial in n) operations are possible to evaluate G(x). Of course another open question is: Are our generic attacks the best possible attacks on our constructions (with k Xor and a few random points)? 
Summary of the results
• k denotes the number of Xor:
• In "scenario 1" we present the number of computations required in a CPA-2 (Adaptive chosen plaintext attack) to distinguish f 1 ⊕ f 2 ⊕ . . . ⊕ f k (with f 1 , . . . , f k ∈ R B n ) from a truly random function h ∈ R F n when the adversary has access to the full codebook. This number is proved to be at least in O(2 n /n 2 3 ) (security results of [2] ) and at most in O(2 n ) ("unstable" attack of Section 2) when all the 2 n inputs/outputs are given).
• "Scenario 2" is like "scenario 1" except that we have access to m input/output pairs, with m 2 n but m < 2 n .
• In "scenario 3" we present the number of computations required in a CPA-2 (Adaptive chosen plaintext attack) to distinguish G from a truly random function h ∈ R F n where G is equal to f 1 ⊕ f 2 ⊕ . . . ⊕ f k (with f 1 , . . . , f k ∈ R B n ) on all the points except on a few points x i where G(x i ) is random. (For example it can be only on the point 0). "≤" denotes the fact that we give here the best known attack. We see that in scenarios 2 and 3 the number of computations can be much larger than in scenario 1.Therefore the design of G can be very efficient in some applications.
With the variant of section 6 (i.e. with only one permutation), the results obtained are the same as for 
In this paper, we have designed new schemes to build PRF from PRP. On these schemes we use k Xor instead of two, on all the points except a few, and on these few points, we have a truly random output. On these new schemes, we have shown that the best known generic attacks have a complexity much larger than O(2 n ). Therefore these schemes might be very useful when we want to generate random functions from random permutations with a small value of n and a high security (security in 2 80 for example and n < 80).
[7] Jacques Patarin. 
Appendices A Mean value and standard deviation of collisions on random functions
Aim. Let f be a random function from I n to I n . We assume that we know f on m distinct points
Let N be the number of collisions on these values y i . We want to evaluate E(N ) (the mean value of N when f ∈ R F n ) and σ(N ) (the standard deviation of N whenf ∈ R F n ).
Computation of E(N ). Let
where Cov(δ i j , δ k l ) denotes the covariance of (δ i j , δ k l ):
We have:
Case 1: i, j, k, l are pairwise distinct. Then
Case 2: In i, j, k, l, we have exactly 3 distinct values. For example i = k. Then
Therefore all the covariance are 0 and we have:
B Mean value and standard deviation of collisions on f ⊕ g, f, g ∈ R B n Aim. Let G = f ⊕ g, with f, g ∈ R B n . We assume that we know G on m distinct points
Let N be the number of collisions on these m values y i . We want to evaluate E(N ) (the mean value of N when f, g ∈ R B n ) and σ(N ) (the standard deviation of N when f, g ∈ R B n ).
is a value different from 0. Therefore the probability when
We now have to evaluate E(δ i j · δ k l ) Case 1: i, j, k, l are pairwise distinct. Then
) and g(x k ) are fixed with
(and these conditions may be compatible or not with g being a permutation). If we did not have these two equalities, for g(x i ) we would have (2 n − 2) possibilities (g(x i ) / ∈ {g(x j ), g(x l )}), and for g(x k ) we would have (2 n − 3) possibilities (g(x k ) / ∈ {g(x i ), g(x j ), g(x l )}. So, E(δ i j · δ k l ) ≤ 1 (2 n − 2)(2 n − 3) Therefore E(δ i j · δ k l ) − E(δ i j )E(δ k l ) ≤ 1 (2 n − 2)(2 n − 3) − 1 (2 n − 1) 2 ≤ 3 · 2 n (2 n − 1) 2 (2 n − 2)(2 n − 3)
≤ O( 1 2 3n ) Case 2: in i, j, k, l, we have exactly 3 distinct values. For example i = k. Then E(δ i j · δ k l ) = P r f,g∈Bn (f (x i ) ⊕ g(x i ) = f (x j ) ⊕ g(x j ) = f (x l ) ⊕ g(x l )) When f (x i ), f (x j ), f (x l ), g(x i ) are fixed, g(x j ) and g(x l ) are fixed with
(and these conditions may be compatible or not with g being a permutation). If we did not have these two equalities, for g(x j ) we would have (2 n − 1) possibilities (g(x j ) = g(x i )) and for g(x l ), we would have (2 n − 2) possibilities (g(x l ) / ∈ {g(x i ), g(x j )}). So
So from ( * ) we get C Mean value and standard deviation of collisions on f 1 ⊕f 2 ⊕. . .⊕f k Theorem 1 Let G = f 1 ⊕ f 2 ⊕ . . . ⊕ f k , f, g ∈ R B n , with f 1 , f 2 , . . . , , f k ∈ R B n . Let assume that we know G on m distinct points x i : ∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, G(x i ) = y i . Let N k be the number of collisions on these m points: N k = the number of (i, j), 1 ≤ i < j ≤ m such that y i = y j . Then
where E(N k ) denotes the mean value of N k when f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f k are randomly chosen in B n .
To prove this theorem we will first need a lemma.
Lemma 1 If x i = x j , we have if ϕ = 0, P r f ∈Bn (f (x i ) ⊕ f (x j ) = ϕ) = 1 2 n − 1 and if ϕ = 0, P r f ∈Bn (f (x i ) ⊕ f (x j ) = ϕ) = 0
